I have published on a wide range of topics in philosophy, including the philosophy of mind and language, the philosophy of artificial intelligence, epistemology, meta-ethics, and the philosophy of logic. Below you will find a selection of publications on these topics. For a full list of my publications, please see my CV.
Philosophy of Mind and Language
Much of my work in the philosophy of mind and language concerns the normativity of meaning and content; the mind-body problem, as it arises for intentionality; and the nature and normativity of belief.
Books
Oughts and Thoughts: Rule Following and the Normativity of Content. Oxford University Press, 2007.
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This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means anything by any word, and argues that there are no facts of the matter as to what anybody ever means. Kripke's argument has inspired a lively and extended debate in the philosophy of language, as it raises some of the most fundamental issues in the field: namely, the reality, privacy, and normativity of meaning. The book argues that in order to achieve the radical conclusion that there are no facts as to what a person means by a word, the sceptic must rely on the thesis that meaning is normative, and that this thesis fails. Since any ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical problem is irremediably incoherent, the book concludes that there must be a fact of the matter about what we mean. The issues considered include the normativity of meaning and its relation to the normativity of moral judgments, reductive and non-reductive theories of meaning, deflationism about truth and meaning, and the privacy of meaning.
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Reviews of Oughts and Thoughts
Ginsborg, Hannah (2010). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content, by Anandi Hattiangadi: Book Reviews. Mind 119 (476):1175-1186.
Elugardo, Reinaldo (2008). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Elugardo, Reinaldo (2008). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Aboutness First: A Defence of the Fundamentality of Intentionality. (Under consideration by Oxford University Press).
Painting by Kitagara Utamaro, Woman Reading a Letter Under a Mosquito Net, Metropolitan Museum of Art.
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In this monograph I put forward a sustained defence of semantic dualism, the view that aboutness, or intentionality, is sui generis and fundamental, that semantic properties, such as the property of having a meaning or content, are robustly real and instantiated, yet fail to metaphysically supervene on any class of non-semantic, non-intentional properties. I develop a three-pronged argument against the view that intentionality supervenes on more fundamental properties that seeks to establish the metaphysical possibility of ‘semantic zombies’—beings that are duplicates of intentional beings in putatively more fundamental respects but who lack intentionality: a conceivability argument; a modal essentialist argument; and a ground-theoretic argument. I consider, and reject, a range of physicalist and non-physicalist accounts of what constitutes semantic properties, including (but not limited to) interpretationism, teleosemantics, inferentialism, and the phenomenal intentionality thesis. I address a range of responses, such as the denial of the robust reality of intentionality, and the acceptance of brute metaphysical necessities. I close with a novel solution to the problem of mental causation.
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50 Years of Naming and Necessity. Corine Besson, Romina Birman, Anandi Hattiangadi and Antonella Mallozzi (eds). (Forthcoming with Oxford University Press.)
Image by Anandi Hattiangadi and Dall-E2
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This collection of essays celebrates the 50th Anniversary of Saul Kripke's masterpiece, Naming and Necessity, which was first published in 1972. The volume contains a historical introduction which looks at the early reception of N&N, as well as original essays discussing a range of issues in philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind, on which N&N has had a lasting influence. Contributors: Katalin Balog, Paul Boghosssian, Alice Damirjian, Michael Devitt, Anandi Hattiangadi, Janet Levin, Antonella Mallozzi, Michaelis Michael, Alex Moran, Stephen Neale, Gary Ostertag, Jessica Pepp, Panu Raatikainen, Brian Rabern, Teresa Robertson Ishii, Nathan Salmón, Sarah Sawyer, Anders Schoubye, Scott Soames, Jennifer Wang, Nathan Wildman, & Stephen Yablo.
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Papers
Forthcoming. ‘Zombies and Essence.’ To appear in Corine Besson, Romina Birman, Anandi Hattiangadi, and Antonella Mallozzi, eds. Naming and Necessity at 50. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (With Alex Moran) Abstract.
2025. ‘Physicalism, Intentionality, and Normativity: The Essential Explanatory Gap.’ In Gary N. Kemp, Ali Hossein Khani, Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, & Hassan Amiriara, eds. Naturalism and its Challenges. New York: Routledge. PDF
2024. Quadders and Zombies: A Kripkean Argument Against Physicalism. In Claudine Verheggen, ed. Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2021. Radical Interpretation and Decision Theory. Synthèse 199: 6473-6494. (With H. Orri Stefánsson.) PDF
2021. ‘Substantive Radical Interpretation and the Problem of Underdetermination.’ Analysis, 80(4): 822-833. PDF
2019. ‘Radical Interpretation and the Aggregation Problem.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 101(2): 283-303. PDF
2018. ‘Normativity and Intentionality.’ In Daniel Star, ed. Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1040-1064.
2017. ‘The Normativity of Meaning.’ In Bob Hale, Alex Miller & Crispin Wright, eds. Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell. 649-669.
2015. ‘The Limits of Expressivism.’ In Stephen Gross, Nicholas Tebben and Michael Williams, eds. Meaning without Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 224-244.
2015.‘Metasemantics out of Economics?’ In A. Reisner and I. Hirose, eds. Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 52-60.
2013. ‘Belief and Its Bedfellows’. In Nikolaj Nottelmann, ed. New Essays On Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013:124-144. (With Tim Bayne.)
2009. ‘Some More Thoughts on Oughts and Thoughts: A Reply to Daniel Whiting.’ Analysis, 69 (1): 54-63.
2009. ‘Semantic Normativity in Context.’ In S. Sawyer, ed. New Waves in the Philosophy of Language. London: Palgrave MacMillan: 87-107.
2025. ‘Physicalism, Intentionality, and Normativity: The Essential Explanatory Gap.’ In Gary N. Kemp, Ali Hossein Khani, Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, & Hassan Amiriara, eds. Naturalism and its Challenges. New York: Routledge. PDF
2024. Quadders and Zombies: A Kripkean Argument Against Physicalism. In Claudine Verheggen, ed. Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2021. Radical Interpretation and Decision Theory. Synthèse 199: 6473-6494. (With H. Orri Stefánsson.) PDF
2021. ‘Substantive Radical Interpretation and the Problem of Underdetermination.’ Analysis, 80(4): 822-833. PDF
2019. ‘Radical Interpretation and the Aggregation Problem.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 101(2): 283-303. PDF
2018. ‘Normativity and Intentionality.’ In Daniel Star, ed. Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1040-1064.
2017. ‘The Normativity of Meaning.’ In Bob Hale, Alex Miller & Crispin Wright, eds. Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell. 649-669.
2015. ‘The Limits of Expressivism.’ In Stephen Gross, Nicholas Tebben and Michael Williams, eds. Meaning without Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 224-244.
2015.‘Metasemantics out of Economics?’ In A. Reisner and I. Hirose, eds. Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 52-60.
2013. ‘Belief and Its Bedfellows’. In Nikolaj Nottelmann, ed. New Essays On Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013:124-144. (With Tim Bayne.)
2009. ‘Some More Thoughts on Oughts and Thoughts: A Reply to Daniel Whiting.’ Analysis, 69 (1): 54-63.
2009. ‘Semantic Normativity in Context.’ In S. Sawyer, ed. New Waves in the Philosophy of Language. London: Palgrave MacMillan: 87-107.
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
I have recently become interested in the philosophy of artificial intelligence, because it seems to me that many of the old chestnuts that have kept me off the streets for decades—concerning understanding, thought, and reasoning—have taken on a new significance. What is it to understand a language, or have propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires or intentions? What is agency? What is artificial general intelligence, and is it emerging in current generation AI systems?
Books
In Progress. Artificial General Intelligence. (By invitation to the Cambridge Elements series, Cambridge University Press.)
Image by Anandi Hattiangadi and Dall-E
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90% of experts predict that within a century, we will see the emergence of artificial general intelligence (AGI)—artificial systems whose intelligence equals or surpasses human intelligence in its generality and power. This prospect evokes both the hope that an AGI will help solve the problems facing humanity, and the fear that an AGI might turn against humans, or outcompete us, and render us extinct. Yet, there is no consensus on how to define the concept of AGI. How, then, can we make reliable predictions about its emergence, or assess the associated benefits or risks? In this Element, I argue that what is distinctive of human intelligence, and thus what an AGI must equal or surpass, is the capacity for using language and for linguistically structured thought. I go on to investigate what is required for a system to possess these capacities, and how we might test whether a system has them. Finally, I consider whether current generation AI systems possess general intelligence even to a degree, what the prospects are for the emergence of AGI, and what we need to consider when evaluating the potential risks and benefits of these systems.
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Alex Grzankowski and Anandi Hattiangadi, eds. Mind, Language and AI: Investigating Large Language Models. Special Issue of Inquiry, 2024
Image by Anandi Hattiangadi and Gemini
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This special issue brings together philosophers of mind and language to investigate the capabilities of Large Language Models, such as Google's Gemini, or OpenAI's ChatGPT.
Contributors: Tim Bayne, Emma Borg, Patrick Butlin, Rosa Cao, Herman Cappelen, Alex Grzankowski, Elizabeth Fricker, Anandi Hattiangadi, Ben Henke, Jessica Pepp, Adrien Prettyman, Susan Schneider, Anders Schoubye, Murray Shanahan, Daniel Stoljar, Michael Tye, Iwan Williams,& Vincent Zhang. |
Papers
In Progress. 'How to Respond to the Simulation Skeptic'. DRAFT.
Forthcoming. ‘Do Large Language Models Understand Natural Language?’ In Herman Cappelen & Rachel Sterken, eds. Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Forthcoming. ‘The Outputs of Large Language Models are Meaningless.’ In Anandi Hattiangadi & Alex Grzankowski, eds. Mind, Language, and AI: Investigating Large Language Models. Special issue of Inquiry. (With Anders Schoubye).
Forthcoming. 'Artificial General Intelligence'. A Philosophical Glossary for AI.
Forthcoming. 'Agency'. A Philosophical Glossary for AI. (WIth Fabio Tollon)
Forthcoming. ‘Do Large Language Models Understand Natural Language?’ In Herman Cappelen & Rachel Sterken, eds. Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Forthcoming. ‘The Outputs of Large Language Models are Meaningless.’ In Anandi Hattiangadi & Alex Grzankowski, eds. Mind, Language, and AI: Investigating Large Language Models. Special issue of Inquiry. (With Anders Schoubye).
Forthcoming. 'Artificial General Intelligence'. A Philosophical Glossary for AI.
Forthcoming. 'Agency'. A Philosophical Glossary for AI. (WIth Fabio Tollon)
Epistemology
I have several papers in epistemology which concern the question whether belief is constituted or governed by a norm of truth. The issues I discuss here connect both with my work in the philosophy of mind, regarding the normativity of belief, as well as my work in the philosophy of logic, which also concerns the normativity of logic, and whether reasoning necessarily involves rule-following. Recently, I have become interested in topics in social epistemology, particularly relating to the polarization of belief. Given the political and social relevance of this topic, I have also given public lectures and recorded podcasts on this topic. (See Events for more details).
Papers
In Progress. ‘Rational Polarization: A Skeptical Puzzle for Truth-Seeking Bayesians’. (With Joe Roussos). Abstract.
In Progress. ‘Polarization and the Formation of Identities.’ (With Fredrik Jansson.)
In Progress. 'Post-Truth and the Quietism Objection to Relativism in Science and Technology Studies.' Draft.
Forthcoming. ‘The Social Dynamics of Knowledge and Ignorance in Digital Societies.’ In Anna Jon-And and Johan Lind, eds. Cultural Evolution: Origins, Mechanisms, and Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
2019. No, One Should Not Believe All Truths. Inquiry, 62(9-10): 1091-1103.
2013. ‘Belief, Truth and Blindspots.’ In Timothy Chan, ed. The Aim of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 100-122. (With Krister Bykvist.)
2010. ‘The Love of Truth.’ In Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 14 (4): 422-423.
2007. ‘Does Thought Imply Ought?’ Analysis, 67: 277-240.
In Progress. ‘Polarization and the Formation of Identities.’ (With Fredrik Jansson.)
In Progress. 'Post-Truth and the Quietism Objection to Relativism in Science and Technology Studies.' Draft.
Forthcoming. ‘The Social Dynamics of Knowledge and Ignorance in Digital Societies.’ In Anna Jon-And and Johan Lind, eds. Cultural Evolution: Origins, Mechanisms, and Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
2019. No, One Should Not Believe All Truths. Inquiry, 62(9-10): 1091-1103.
2013. ‘Belief, Truth and Blindspots.’ In Timothy Chan, ed. The Aim of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 100-122. (With Krister Bykvist.)
2010. ‘The Love of Truth.’ In Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 14 (4): 422-423.
2007. ‘Does Thought Imply Ought?’ Analysis, 67: 277-240.
Philosophy of Logic
Many issues in the philosophy of mind, language, and epistemology are closely related to issues in the philosophy of logic. I have focused in my research on issues relating to the normativity of logic, rule following and the 'adoption problem'. I also apply work in formal semantics and philosophy of logic to the case of logical disagreement.
Papers
In Progress. 'Deductive Reasoning Without Rule-Following.' (With Corine Besson) Abstract. Draft.
Forthcoming. ‘Logical Disagreement.’ In Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Filippo Ferrari, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher, and Florian Steinberger, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (With Frederik Andersen, in press) Abstract.
2023. ‘Conventionalism and the Adoption Problem.’ Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 97 (1):47-81. PDF
2023. ‘Is Logic Normative?’. In P. Raatikainen, ed. Acta Philosophica Fennica: Special Issue on the Philosophy of Language.
2018. ‘Logical Disagreement’. In Daniel Whiting and Conor McHugh, eds. Meta-Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 88-106.
Forthcoming. ‘Logical Disagreement.’ In Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Filippo Ferrari, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher, and Florian Steinberger, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (With Frederik Andersen, in press) Abstract.
2023. ‘Conventionalism and the Adoption Problem.’ Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 97 (1):47-81. PDF
2023. ‘Is Logic Normative?’. In P. Raatikainen, ed. Acta Philosophica Fennica: Special Issue on the Philosophy of Language.
2018. ‘Logical Disagreement’. In Daniel Whiting and Conor McHugh, eds. Meta-Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 88-106.
Meta-Ethics
I have primarily worked on two main issues in meta-ethics. The first concerns the connections between normativity and intentionality. The second concerns the claim that the moral facts supervene on the natural facts with metaphysical necessity, which I have criticized. Both relate closely to work I have done on the mind-body problem, where I criticize the view that semantic and intentional facts supervene on the physical, and work I have done on the normativity of meaning and content.
Papers
In Progress. 'Moral Supervenience and Grounding Laws Contingentism.' In Alex Moran and Ralf Bader, eds. Reduction in Metaphysics, Mind, and Meta-Ethics. (With Alex Moran)
Forthcoming. ‘Expressivism Generalized: From Morality to Intentionality.’ In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory.' (With Åke Gafvelin.)
Forthcoming. ‘Zombies and Essence.’ To appear in Corine Besson, Romina Birman, Anandi Hattiangadi, and Antonella Mallozzi, eds. Naming and Necessity at 50. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (With Alex Moran) Abstract.
2025. ‘Physicalism, Intentionality, and Normativity: The Essential Explanatory Gap.’ In Gary N. Kemp, Ali Hossein Khani, Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, & Hassan Amiriara, eds. Naturalism and its Challenges. New York: Routledge. PDF
2024. Quadders and Zombies: A Kripkean Argument Against Physicalism. In Claudine Verheggen, ed. Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2019. ‘Non-Reductive Realism, Primitivism, and the Reduction Argument: Commentary on Bart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors.’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 16(6):697-706.
2018. ‘Moral Supervenience.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 48 (3-4):592-615 (2018). PDF
2018. ‘The Normativity of meaning and the Hard Problem of Intentionality.’ Symposium on Allan Gibbard’s Meaning and Normativity. Inquiry 61(7):742-754.
2015. ‘The Limits of Expressivism.’ In Stephen Gross, Nicholas Tebben and Michael Williams, eds. Meaning without Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 224-244.
Forthcoming. ‘Expressivism Generalized: From Morality to Intentionality.’ In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory.' (With Åke Gafvelin.)
Forthcoming. ‘Zombies and Essence.’ To appear in Corine Besson, Romina Birman, Anandi Hattiangadi, and Antonella Mallozzi, eds. Naming and Necessity at 50. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (With Alex Moran) Abstract.
2025. ‘Physicalism, Intentionality, and Normativity: The Essential Explanatory Gap.’ In Gary N. Kemp, Ali Hossein Khani, Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, & Hassan Amiriara, eds. Naturalism and its Challenges. New York: Routledge. PDF
2024. Quadders and Zombies: A Kripkean Argument Against Physicalism. In Claudine Verheggen, ed. Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2019. ‘Non-Reductive Realism, Primitivism, and the Reduction Argument: Commentary on Bart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors.’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 16(6):697-706.
2018. ‘Moral Supervenience.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 48 (3-4):592-615 (2018). PDF
2018. ‘The Normativity of meaning and the Hard Problem of Intentionality.’ Symposium on Allan Gibbard’s Meaning and Normativity. Inquiry 61(7):742-754.
2015. ‘The Limits of Expressivism.’ In Stephen Gross, Nicholas Tebben and Michael Williams, eds. Meaning without Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 224-244.
Future Contingents
Manuel García-Carpintero gave a talk at the Philosophical Society at Oxford on relativism about future contingents. Corine Besson started talking about this, and for a long time, couldn't stop. These conversations led to three papers on topic.
2022. Can Truth Relativism Account for the Indeterminacy of Future Contingents? In Maria Baghramian & Mark Bowker (eds.) Special Issue: Indeterminacy and Underdetermination, Synthèse, 200:230-253. (With Corine Besson) PDF
2020. Assertion and the Future. In The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (With Corine Besson)
2013. ‘The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion,’ Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 251-271. (With Corine Besson)
2020. Assertion and the Future. In The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (With Corine Besson)
2013. ‘The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion,’ Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 251-271. (With Corine Besson)
Feminism
Though feminism was my first love in philosophy, my research has moved away from these topics. Recently, I have formed a working group to discuss the backlash against 'feminization' of society expressed both in the popular press and academic literature. The claim we critically assess is that the demographic shift in the global North towards greater gender equality in the private and public sectors has had negative consequences for society, such as a lowering of standards, and a decrease in law and order.
In Progress. ‘The Backlash Against the Feminization of Society.' (With Andrea Asker Svedberg, Siska de Baerdemaker, Katharina Berndt Rasmussen, Stina Björkholm, Alice Damirjian, Julia Mosquera, Joe Roussos, & Rojan Karakaya).